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Abernathy: Assemblies in the Public Streets
ASSEMBLIES IN THE PUBLIC STREETS
GLENN ABERNATHY*

The assemblies which have offered probably the most frequent
occasion for legal and physical clashes between police officials and
individuals attempting to exercise their right to assemble, or to
collect assemblies, have been those taking place on municipal streets.
The problem of street meetings is pre-eminently an urban problem,
and customarily one which faces only cities with a substantial population.
Since the problem of street meetings raises several common law
questions, an examination of pertinent English cases is made to
furnish background for American practice. In certain other aspects
of the problem English law has developed in a fashion nearly parallel
to that in the United States, and the English cases on these points are
included to bring into sharper focus the major questions of law
and administration which street meetings present.
It can be stated with some certainty that there exists no right in
England to hold a meeting on the public streets. 1 Until recent years
the same statement could be made concerning United States practice, but holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Hague v.
C.I.O,2 and in Kunz v. State of New York$ indicate a strong trend
in the direction of a clear statement of a basic right to speak and
assemble in the public streets.4 But even the assumption that there
is no right of meeting in the streets does not mean that all such
meetings are per se either nuisances or unlawful meetings. In Fairbanks v. Kerr5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pointed this out
clearly with respect to nuisances:
OB.S., Birmingham-Southern, 1942; M.A., University of Alabama, 1947; Assistant- Pro-

fessor of Political Science, University of South Carolina.

1. For discussions of the right of assembly in England see:

Diczy, INTRo-

DUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION C. VII (9th London
ed. 1948) ; 2 KEITH, THE CONSTITUTION OP ENGLAND VROM QUEEN VICTORIA TO
GEORGE VI 408-415 (London 1940) ; Goodhart, Public Meetings and Processions,

6 CAmp. L. J. 161 (1937); Jennings, The Right of Assembly in England, 9
N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 217 (1931) ; W.A AND PHILLips, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2nd London ed. 1935) ; D. G.Hitchner, Freedom of Public Meeting in England
Since 1914, 36 Ama. PoL. ScI. Rxv. 516 (1942)..
2.307 U. S.496 (1939).
3.340 U. S,290 (1951).
4.For discussions of the right of assembly in the United States see: J. M.
Jarrett and V. A. Mund, The Right of Assembly, 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. Riev. 1
(1931) ; Public Order and the Right of Assembly in England and the United
tates, 47 YALE L. 3. 404 (1938). For annotated collections of the earlier
cases concerning street speakers see: 10 A. L. R. 1483; 62 A. J. R. 404.
5.70 Pa.86, 10 Am.Rep.664 (1872).
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A street may not be used, in strictness of law, for public
speaking; even preaching or public worship, or a pavement before another's house may not be occupied to annoy him; but it
does not follow that every one who speaks or preaches in the
street, or who happens to collect a crowd therein by other means,
is therefore guilty of the indictable offense of a. nuisance. His
act may become a nuisance by his obstruction of the public highway, but it will not do to say it is a nuisance per se. Such a
stringent interpretation ....
is scarcely suited to the genius of
our people or to the character of their institutions, and would
lead to the repression of many'usages of the people now tolerated
8
as harmless, if not necessary.
This, opinion by Justice Agnew would be considered by today's
advocates of free speech and assembly as overly restrictive of our
constitutional rights. But the case is one of the earliest reported
American cases on the general subject of street meetings. The importance of these earlier decisions is not to be minimized because
they do not categorically state that there is a right to speak in the
public streets. Evidence as to the latitude allowed by municipalities
in street meetings prior to the latter nineteenth century is inconclusive. But it would seem to be a safe presumption from the general
tenor of the opinion in the Fairbanks case that the decision represented either an enlargement of individual freedom as compared to
prior periods or at least a restraint on contemporary efforts to restrict such freedom more closely. The Court used only a rather
vague reference to the "genius of our people" and the "character
of their institutions" in holding that a street meeting is somewhat
different from the type of situation or action which is a nuisance
per se. In all probability, however, the cautious statements in the
Fairbanks case represent the initial step toward the broader judicial
7
protection for such meetings offered by Hague v. C.I.O.
A legislative prohibition against all street meetings would solve
the difficulties of determining whether in individual cases a nuisance
was constituted. However, this remedy would leave no room for
any meeting, whether a nuisance or not, and from the legal standpoint the American courts have in a number of ifistances held that
such a prohibition would be considered violative of fundamental
rights. The decision in an Illinois case is illustrative of the general
6. Ibid., at 669, per Agnew, J. -A similar holding on this point by an English
court is found in Burden v. Rigler, (1911) 1 _ B. 337.
7. 307 U. S. 496 (1939).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol5/iss3/4

2

Abernathy: Assemblies in the Public Streets

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY

sentiment of state courts with respect to such a prohibition. The
case involved the question of the validity of an ordinance permitting
street assemblies only upon receipt of a permit from the mayor. The
court upheld the requirement of a permit but limited the powers
of the municipality with respect to such assemblies by stating:
If, however, the true construction [of the ordinance] would
apply it to all "meetings or gatherings of any kind, or for any
purpose, upon the public streets or public grounds of said city,"
then because it makes no distinction, nor enables the court to
make any, between such meetings, on any ground, we think it
not a rightful exercise of the police power.8
In a habeas corpus proceeding, In re Gribben,9 in the Territory
of Oklahoma the validity of a "Salvation Army ordinance" was
questioned which prohibited the "making of any noise upon streets
or sidewalks of the city, by means of drums or musical instruments
or otherwise, of such a character . . . as to annoy and disturb

others." While on its face the ordinance was a regulation of noise,
it was clearly directed to the end of preventing meetings and processions of the Salvation Army. The opinion of Justice Tarsney, speaking for the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, emphasized the discriminatory aspects of the administration of the ordinance, but implicit in
other parts of the opinion was the recognition of a fundamental
right of lawful meeting and procession in the public streets. The
Justice stated:
So long as
have existed,
movement of
cal, religious,

there have been municipal codes, so long as cities
the use of public streets for processions, for the
bodies of the people, whether organized as politior social organizations, has been recognized as a

proper and lawful use of such streets; . . . A city implies a

large aggregation of people. The use of its streets contemplates
not quietude and repose, but the noise, bustle, and confusion
incident to the transaction of the lawful business of the people,
and their lawful and harmless amusements and recreations,
pleasures and devotions. These are but incidents of a city's
life.10
Certainly the Court was not trying to state that every anti-noise
ordinance would receive similar treatment. The conclusion must be
8. Bloomington v. Richardson, 38 IMi. App. 60, 61 (1889).

9. 5 Okla. 379, 47 P. 1074 (1897).
10. Ibid., at 1078.
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that the Court felt that the holding of meetings and processions in the
public streets was of sufficient importance to overcome the contention
that the accompanying noise and, in this instance, music were so
disturbing to the public as to permit municipal prohibition of such
meetings. In addition, the opinion indicates a strong presumption
in favor of street meetings generally, and, further, an implied rejection of municipal power to prohibit completely any and all such
meetings.
Other state courts during the same period were, however, holding
differently, to the effect that municipalities can restrict or prohibit
completely the use of public places for speeches- or assemblies. The
leading case illustrating this view is Commonwealth of Massachusetts
v. Davis,i 1 decided in 1895. The Massachusetts courts have traditionally taken a highly conceptual approach to the subject of civil
liberties, as subsequent cases treated here illustrate, and apparently
have felt that emphasis on the rights of property is the safer legal
ground, even though -resulting decisions be restrictive of the exercise
of basic personal rights. The Davis case presented the question of
whether a permit could constitutionally be required of persons using the public parks for speeches. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
majority of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, made the statement
which has ever since been the major thorn in the side -of the -advo---cates of broad use of the streets and parks for public speeches and
assemblies:
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner
of a private house to forbid it in his own house. When no proprietary rights interfere, the legislature may end the right of
the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to
the dedicaticn to public uses. So it may take the less step of
limiting the public use to certain purposes.12
Until 1939 the United States Supreme Court was committed to
the Davis rule and the implications it contained. The various state
courts took a diverging path with respect to street meetings, some
following the view outlined in Bloomington v. Richardson's and
others following the more restrictive Davis rule. In 1939 the United
States Supreme Court, apparently attempting to change the Davis
11. 162 Mass. 510, 39 N. E. 113 (1895), af'd, 167 U. S. 43 (1897).
12. 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N. E. 113 (1895), af'd, 167 U. S. 43 (1897).
13. 38 II. App. 60 (1889).
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rule without expressly overruling it, stated in Hague v. C.I.O.14 the
view that street meetings must be accorded a special protection. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, said:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.1 5
Since the Hague case, the state courts have generally inclined to
the view that the Davis rule has been reversed in substance, even if
not by name. While the decision of the Court in Hague v. C.LO.
reflected in great part the liberalizing influence of the Roosevelt
appointees, it is probable that by that year the general sentiment in
the United States was that past treatment of such groups as the
Salvation Army, in the latter nineteenth century, and the Socialists,
in the twentieth century, represented a discomfiting phase in the
history of a free country and should not be continued. Judges are
responsive to the fears and remorses of society as a whole, and they,
too, could begin to relax somewhat the restrictive attitudes toward
minorities in those years of optimism toward the end of the depression years. The new minority of the late thirties was the militant,
aggressive C.I.O., and very possibly the Court thought that a timely
restraint could forestall attempts to focus old discriminatory practices on a. new minority.
Even to presume the existence of a constitutional right to assemble
in the streets is not to say, however, that the right is any more absolute than other similar rights, and certain restrictions may constitutionally be placed upon its exercise. Since there definitely appears
to be an area of street meetings which offer no legal objections, the
question arises as to just where the line is to be drawn. What types
of meetings can be held legally and with constitutional protections
thrown about them, and what types of meetings are not so protected
by law or constitution? Who is to decide whether or not a particular
meeting is permissible, and on what basis is the decision to be made?
As would be expected, the cases reveal no dear-cut definition of just
what types of street meetings are absolutely guaranteed against
abridgment. Time, place, and circumstances must all be considered
14. 307 U.S.52 (1939).
15. 307 U. S. 52, at 515 (1939). See also the more recent case of Kunz v.
State of New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951), in which Vinson, C. J., speaking
for a majority of the Court, quoted with approval this section of Justice

Roberts' opinion.
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in making the decision as to the legality of particular meetings, and
the courts can only pick out the line between permissible and nonpermissible meetings in case by case investigations, often shifting
previous lines toward more, or less, restriction, as the occasion seems
to demand.
One might attempt to shrug the whole problem off with the facile
remedy, "Hire a hail !" But the crux of the problem of assemblies
on the public streets lies in the recognition of two facts: first, oftentimes the groups or persons participating are adherents of a locally
unpopular political or religious creed and are not in a secure financial
position, and, therefore, they are unable because of local prejudice or
lack of money to rent an auditorium; and, second, in the great preponderance of cases of street assemblies, the sponsors must depend on
collaring the casual passerby to acquire an audience for the dissemination of their views. In either situation these minorities must rely
on public places such as streets or parks if their advocacy is to be at
all effective. Masons, Elks, American Legionnaires, and members of
organized, "acceptable" religious or political groups usually have no
difficulty in holding their meetings, since they normally will have
not only meeting places but a readymade audience of their own members, and recruiting of new members or followers is carried out
through more formal, community-acceptable procedures. The advocate of a new faith or new political theory or even a theme which
is not new but which is unpopular locally does not speak under such
propitious circumstances. He might well find that owners of local
auditoriums claim to be booked solidly for the next year or so when
he attempts to rent a place to speak.s5a And, presuming he has both
money and opportunity to rent such a place, he might well find that
no one has bothered to attend his speech when the time arrives. The
only practicable solution from his point of view is for him to attempt
15a. See Public Order and Right of Assembly in England and the United
States, 47 YALZ L. J. 404 (1938). At p. 421 the author states: "Municipal
authorities employ numerous techniques to thwart indoor meetings (of minority
groups). Most direct and blunt is Mayor Hague's ordinance which, in effect,
forbids the owner of a meeting hall to rent it for Communist meetings unless
police permission is first secured. It is exceptional to require permits for
meetings held in private halls; a more common technique stems from laws
requiring licenses for theaters and public halls. These are presumably operative to safeguard buildings against fire and similar hazards. Nevertheless owners who do not cooperate with the police by refusing to rent their halls to
objectionable radicals sometimes find their licenses revoked because of the
'structural . . . condition' of the building. A final source of discrimination
arises in connection with the administration of statutes authorizing municipalities to issue permits for the use of school buildings to permit 'discussion of
matters of . . . public interest.' A recent survey has disclosed frequent and
confessed discriminations against political minorities seeking such permits."
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to reach the audience wherever it is most available -in the streets
and parks. Aside from any constitutional right involved, it is submitted that there is a considerable value in the mental nudges which
the more conservative groups of our society receive from the unpopular and unorthodox views which are often confined to streetcorner advocacy. Even though the listener remain unconverted, he
at least will be forced to some degree of rethinking and restating of
his own position, and there is certainly some gain inherent in this
process. And, after all, the right of free speech is of no consequence
if there be no concurrent right of assembly or right to try to induce
an assembly to gather. The right to speak is not confined to speech
in vacuo. The law, however, has only casually, if at all, recognized
the sociological and financial aspects of street meetings up to about
16
the time of the Hague case.
Generally, English and American courts have in the past taken
a position in favor of legislative restrictions on street meetings. The
emphasis has been on the rights of the municipality as a property owner rather than on the protection of broad individual rights. The street
meeting has been regarded as a privilege which could be restricted
or revoked more or less at the pleasure of the legislative body or,
to a lesser degree, the police. The English view, and that of a
number of our state courts, seems to be well stated in the case of
Regina v. Graham.'7 The case involved the question of the right
of the people to assemble on Trafalgar Square. Justice Charles, in
charging the jury, said:
Undoubtedly Trafalgar-square has been used from time to
time for public meetings, . . . (but) I can find no warrant
for telling you that there is a,right of public meeting either in
Trafalgar-square or any other public thoroughfare. So far as
I know the law of England, the use of public thoroughfares is
for people to pass and repass along them. That is the purpose
for which they are dedicated by the owner of them to the use
of the public, and they are not dedicated to the public use for
any other purpose that I know of than for the purpose of passing and repassing; . . . and it seems to me (Trafalgar-square)
would be very analogous to the case of public thoroughfares;
and equally on the part of the public they have no right, although
16. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 111 (1943) in which Justice
Douglas, for the majority, said, "Freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their
own way." It is to be presumed that freedom of assembly would also be included among those mentioned.
17, 16 Cox C. C. 420 (1888).
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they may often do it without objection, the public have no right
to hold there any meetings for discussion upon any questions, be
they social, political, or religious. 18
Commonwealth v. Davis,19 a Massachusetts case decided about the
same time as Regina v. Graham, shows a very similar approach to the
question of the right to assemble in the streets. The Davis case has
been cited as precedent by many American courts in upholding various restrictions on such assemblies. English law seems to have remained very conservative in this respect, while American law has
tended to develop along line somwhat more favorable to the holding of street meetings. Certainly the opinions in Hague v. C.I.O.
and Kunz v. State of New York2 0 indicate a substantial deviation
in the direction of greater freedom to assemble in the streets and
parks. In fact, it is difficult to see how the distinguishing of the
latter two cases from the Davis case can be anything other than an
overruling of the earlier holding.
Since we do not enjoy an absolute right of assembly in the public
ways, the question arises as to the conditions under which such a
meeting might be properly held. The simpler legal approach to this
question is an examination of the methods employed (and the basis
for their employment) by public officials and private parties in preventing or dispersing street meetings. Such meetings which fall in
the category of unlawful assemblies have been considered earlier.
A number of other methods have been and are being used, and these
will be considered separately.
An early New York case, Adans v. Rivers,2 ' points to the possibility of an action in trespass. The theory is that a public highway
has been dedicated, or an easement acquired, in order that the public
have the right to pass and repass at their pleasure for the purpose
of legitimate travel. Any purpose other than this for which the
street is used becomes immediately a trespass. Adams brought an
action in trespass against Rivers, who stood on the street in front of
Adams' property and used abusive and insulting language to him. In
a verdict for the plaintiff Willard, P. J., stated:
Subject to the right of mere passage, the owner of the soil
is still absolute master. The horseman can not stop to graze
his steed, without being a trespasser; it is only in case of in18. Ibid., at 429, 430. For a similar view see Ex parte Lewis, 21 Q. B. D.
191 (1888).
19. 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895).

20. 340 U. S. 290 (1951).

21. 11 Barbour 390 (N. Y. 1851).
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evitable, or at least accidental detention, that he can be excused
even in halting for a moment.22
He stated further:
The public have no need of the highway but to pass and repass. If it is used for any other purpose not justified by law,
the owners of the adjoining land are remitted to the same rights
they possessed before the highway was made. They can protect themselves against such annoyances, by treating the intruders
23
as trespassers.
Implicit in this opinion is the assumption that the adjoining landowner owns the fee in the street.23a It would appear, from the holding in this case, that the public is severely restricted in its activities
in the public streets by the possibility of an action in trespass. The
Court is not clear as to just how narrowly this doctrine would be
applied, but such an action would offer the probability of success,
according to the opinion, if the behavior of the user of the street
were either unlawful or a substantial annoyance to the adjoining
property holder.
A later English case, Harrison v. Duke of Rutland,24 considers

the same legal question and draws a somewhat clearer distinction
between actionable and non-actionable uses of the public ways in
trespass cases. In that case the Duke was engaged in the traditional
English sport of shooting grouse on his property and near, the highway. His keepers were driving the grouse toward the Duke and
his friends. Harrison walked along the highway waving his handkerchief and opening and shutting his umbrella to scare the grouse
away from the hunters. The keepers, after their warnings were
ignored, threw him to the ground and held him until the drive was
over. Harrison's contention of assault was countered by a claim of
trespass.
In upholding the Duke's claim Lord Esher, M. P., stated:
[Plaintiff] was using this part of the highway solely for the
purpose of interfering with the rights which the owner of the
land was exercising on another part of his land .

. .

. He was,

therefore, not there for the purpose of using the highway as
22. Ibid., at 393-4.
23. Ibid., at 398.

23a. Of course, in some situations the fee may not be in the adjoining landowner but may be in the municipality by purchase, condemnation or otherwise.
See 25 Am. Jur. 430. In the latter cases there would be no basis for an action
in trespass by the adjoining landowner against a user of the street.
24. 1 Q. B. 142 (1893).
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such in any of the ordinary and usual modes in which people
use a highway. Under these circumstances, I think that he was
a trespasser. Cases might arise in which it would be a question whether what a person was doing was a reasonable and
usual use of a highway. In such cases there might be a question
for a jury as to whether such person was using the highway as
a highway for passing, in accordance with the reasonable and
ordinary user of it for that purpose. In this case, on the undisputed facts, it appears to me clear that the plaintiff was a
trespasser .... 25
It would appear, then, from the opinion quoted, that there are
two tests employed to determine whether a trespass has been committed by a highway user against a property owner whose property
adjoins the highway. First, the person on the highway must be engaging in some activity which is not a "reasonable and ordinary
use" of the streets. Second, that activity must be an interference
with the rights which the owner of the land exercises. The second
qualification would, of course, serve to ameliorate an otherwise
strained application of the law of trespass. Another English case,
Hickman v. Maisey,26 decided a few years after the Duke of Rutland
case, illustrates the same rule of law, since the earlier case was
followed explicitly. In Hickman v. Maisey the question was whether
a racing tout, who walked up and down the highway for the purpose
of watching horses which were being trained in an adjoining field,
committed a trespass against the owner of the land on which the
highway was situated. In holding this action a trespass, the Court
apparently found that the effect of the watching was to depreciate
the value of the plaintiff's land as a place for the training and trial
of race-horses.
As to the law of England on the application of trespass cases to
street meetings, Professor A. L. Goodhart states:
Whatever acts may be considered to be included in the right
to pass and repass.. . , it is obvious that a public meeting cannot
be one of them. It follows that a public meeting is always
a trespass against the person in whom the property in the highway is vested unless he has expressly or tacitly licensed the
27
holding of such a meeting.
25. Itbd., at 147.
26. 1 Q. B. 752 [1900].

27. 6 C mB. L. J. 161, 163 (1937).
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The Public Health Act of 187528 vests streets repairable by the
2 9 It
inhabitants at large within urban areas in the urban authority.
would seem, then, that the urban authority may prevent the holding
of street meetings. Thus via the route of the law of trespass the
same conclusion can be reached which the courts did reach in the
Dazis case and in Regina v. Graham, discussed earlier: that the municipality may allow, restrict or prohibit street meetings, in the discretion of the municipal officers.
The fact that a street meeting constitutes a trespass does not,
however, mean that it constitutes a wrong against the members of
the general public. As far as they are concerned, the meeting is a
wrong only if it is a nuisance or, presumably, if it is an unlawful
assembly. And certainly not all such meetings can correctly or legally be classified as nuisances. As Justice Agnew of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
Such a stringent interpretation . . . is scarcely suited to

the genius of our people or to the character of their institutions,
and would lead to the repression of many usages of the people
now tolerated as harmless, if not necessary.8 0
Probably the most pervasive discouragement to street meetings
lies in the application of two types of municipal ordihiances: those
designed to prevent obstructions in the streets and those requiring
a permit before engaging in street meetings. The former is used
as a basis for dispersal, and the latter customarily is used to prevent
the gathering of a crowd in the first place, although it also comes
into play as a ground for dispersal if the group holding the meeting
has not obtained the requisite permit prior to the occasion.
States and municipalities generally have enacted broad prohibitions against obstructions to travel in the highways

-certainly

a

subject requiring regulation.3 1 England provided similar restric28. 38 and 39 Vict., c. 55, § 149.
29. 16 HALSBURY, LAWS or ENGLAND § 299 (2nd ed. 1935).
30. Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. 86, 10Am. Rep. 664, at 669 (1872).
31. A typical state statute is that of South Carolina: "It shall be unlawful
for any person wilfully . . . to place obstructions upon any . . . highway or

to throw or place on any such highway any objects likely to cut or otherwise
injure vehicles using them. A violation of this section shall be punishable by
a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or imprisonment for not more
than thirty days."

S. C. Cone or LAws § 33-491 (1952).

And the South Caro-

lina courts have held that the mere obstructing of a highway is in itself a
nuisance. State v. Harden, 11 S. C. 360, 366, 1 Am. St. Rep. 843 (1878).
It is said that it is a nuisance "to organize or take part in a procession or
meeting which naturally results in an obstruction and is an unreasonable user
9f the highway." 16 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND 362 (2d ed. 1935).
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tions in the Highways Act of 1835.32 And every street meeting
constitutes at least a technical obstruction. Again referring to the
theory regarding the public user of the highways, the right of the
public with respect to the highways begins and ends, technically,
with the use of passing and repassing. Since a public meeting does
not come within the usual interpretation of passing and repassing,
it can easily be classified as an obstruction in violation of the prohibitions against blocking highway travel. Then to prove a violation
of these statutes must the officers show an actual obstruction to travel
going on at the time? Suppose the participants arrange themselves
so as to permit ample passage around them; is there then an "obstruction" within the terms of the statutes?
Both in English and American law it would seem that any meeting which appreciably obstructs the highway would constitute a
nuisance 3 3 The test is whether it "renders the way less commodious
than before to the public." 3 4 The fact that sufficient alternative
passage space is left is no defense. Moreover, it is not necessary
to show that persons have actually been obstructed, since the offense
is the placing of any obstructions in the highway,35 even though evidence might be introduced to prove that no one was in fact obstructed
in his travel on the highway. Halsbury's Laws of England states
that, "It is no defence to show that . . . though a part of the
highway actually used by passengers is obstructed, sufficient available
space is left."36 The Massachusetts Supreme Court followed a sinilar rule in Commnonwealth v. Surridge3 7 and upheld its traditionally
narrow approach to personal liberties. In that case the Court affirmed
the conviction of a street speaker for the common law offense of
obstructing a public way. Chief Justice Rugg, speaking for the Court,
stated:
32. 5 and 6 Will. 4, c. 50, § 72.
33. R. v. Bartholomew, [1908] 1 K. B. 554, 561; Thomas v. Casey, 121 N. J.

Law 185, 1 A. 2d 866 (1938), aff'd, 123 N. J. Law 447, 9 A. 2d 294 (1939).

See Goodhart, op. cit., 164. In Alred v. Miller, Sess. Cas. 117 (Ct. of Justiciary
1924), Lord Sands said at p. 121: "When meetings [in the highways] are
customary, they are not interfered with. On the other hand, . . . if they
cause an obstruction, they are an offence."
34. HAWKINS, PLI As OF THE CROWN Bk. 1, c. 32 (8th London ed. 1824).
35. See the wording of the South Carolina Act regarding obstructions and
the court's interpretation of it in note 31, supra. An interesting historical
note is struck by an Iowa municipal ordinance of the late 19th Century which
prohibited the collection of crowds "so as to obstruct travel [or] frighten
horses." See Chariton v. Fitzsimmons, 87 Iowa 226, 54 N. W. 146 (1893).
It is possibly some expansion of our area of freedom to assemble in the streets
not to have such exercise dependent upon the emotional stability of horses in

the vicinity.
36. 16 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 355 (2d ed. 1935).
37. 265 Mass. 425, 164 N. E. 480, 62 A. L. R. 402 (1929).
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By the location of a highway an easement of passage is secured for the public with all incidental privileges thereby implied
.... The easement of passage for the public ... includes reasonable means of transportation for persons and commodities
and of transmission of intelligence. Whatever interferes with
the exercise of this easement is a nuisance, even though no
inconvenience or delay to public travel actually takes place. 8s
In an earlier case, People v. Pierce,3 9 the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, was even more explicit in pointing out
that actual obstruction to travellers need not be proved. Justice
Smith, speaking for the Court, stated:
It cannot be necessary to show that some travelers who attempted to pass through the crowd were hindered thereby. They
might well have passed from the street before reaching the
crowd that was before them, in order to avoid collision with the
40
crowd.
The more reasonable view, however, would seem to be that of
the dissenting justice, Parker, who appeared to be strongly opposed
to such a narrowly technical application of the law as would present
a bar to any and all street meetings. For him, conviction for street
obstruction, at least in the case of street speakers, should be obtained
only where an actual obstruction to passers-by was proved.
I do not dispute the power of the city to make the ordinance
prohibiting the gathering of crowds to the hinderance of free
travel, but no act should be deemed a violation of the provision
that has not worked a substantial hindrance to the use of the
street, or caused substantial and actual annoyance to the citizen.
A crowd should not be condemned as having violated that ordinance, that is quiet and orderly, and affects public travel no
more than to require it to slow up.or turn to one side in pass1
ing.4
In 1948 in Ex parte Bodkin42 the California District Court of Appeals for the First District upheld a conviction under a general
municipal obstruction ordinance. But in so holding, the opinion of
Justice Dooling, for the Court, made it clear that actual obstruction
38. Commonwealth v. Surridge, 265 Mass. 425, 164 N. E. 480, 481 (1929).

39.
40.
41.
42.

85 App. Div. 125, 83 N. Y. Supp. 79 (1903).
83 N. Y. Supp. 79, 81 (1903).
Ibid., at p. 82.
86 Cal'. App. 2d 203, 194 P. 2d 588 (1948).
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must be proved under the meaning of the ordinance. The ordinance
in question provided: "Whenever the free passage of any street
or sidewalk in the Town [of Emeryville] shall be obstructed by a
crowd, the persons composing such crowd shall disperse or move on
when directed to do so by a police officer ....
"
Justice Dooling stated:
It was established in this case that the passage of some members of the public along the street was in fact obstructed. If
nobody had desired to use this street at the time another question would be presented ....
Again, since the question of whether or not the free passage
of the street or sidewalk was "obstructed" is one of fact, it was
entirely possible for the petitioner herein to make the same
speech on some other busier but broader street where the attendant crowd would not have constituted an "obstruction" within the meaning of the ordinance. 48
In summary, then, it may be said that meetings in the public
streets, no matter how reasonable or desirable their purpose may be,
are nuisances if they cause any appreciable obstruction, 44 and that
in some states it is not necessary to prove that in fact any one has
been prevented from passing to prove the offense of obstructing
the highways.
If this be the law regarding highway obstructions, the question
arises as to whether any street meeting can be outside the interpretation of obstructions, and therefore legally permissible. Probably
most, if not all, such meetings are technical obstructions or even
nuisances. But it is the usual practice both in he United States and
England to take no official action to halt meetings which constitute
a technical obstruction only. The law regarding obstructions, however, does place the participants in a street meeting in the precarious
position of enjoying such a privilege only at the whim of the police
officials. Obstruction ordinances, nevertheless, have been upheld
both against constitutional objections 45 and against attacks based on
43. Ex parte Bodkin, 194 P. 2d 588, 591 (1948).
44. Any use of the highway, however reasonable and convenient to the general
public it may be, is a nuisance if it interferes with the right of passage. R. v.
Train, 2 B & S 640 (1862).
45. Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U. S. 32 (1899); ex parte Garrison, 18
Cal. App. Zd 495, 64 P. 2d 1007 (1937); Tacoma v. Roe, 190 Wash. 444, 68
P. 2d 1028 (1937).
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the ground that the ordinances are unreasonable and therefore' ultra
vires.4 6
It does not require a great deal of imagination to suspect that unpopular groups will, in the eyes of the police, tend to create obstructions where a more acceptable organization will not. Cases froin
the police courts of a number of larger cities would be necessary
for investigation before definite support for this surmise could be
offered. Such information is not readily available in any satisfactory form. Even the recorded cases would not include the countless
situations in which assemblies have been dispersed for obstructing
traffic with no arrests having been made. The reported cases involving the use of devices other than obstruction ordinances give
more substantial documentation for a contention of discriminatory
police action ;47 but the obstruction cases indicate ground for suspicion that the extent of the obstruction quite probably varies inversely with the popularity of the doctrines expounded. The Surridge4 '
case involved a soap-box orator who made a speech touching on
"the right of the people to assemble in or use the streets for the purposes of free speech." In Ex parte Bodkin"9 the arrested speaker
was addressing a group of workers in apparent protest over the TaftHartley Act then pending before Congress. In another obstruction
case, People v. Wallace,5 0 the police intervened to disperse an assembly being addressed by an organizer of the Socialist Labor Party.
Tacoma v. Roe51 involved the conviction of a "political speaker" presumably a member of some minority party from the flavor of
the opinion of the court. And while in its infancy the Salvatioir
Army came in for its share of prosecutions under obstruction ordinances, e. g., Mashburn v. City of Bloomington.52
Of course, it would be unfair to 'conclude that prejudice alone is
the determining factor in such prosecutions, since it can probably
be shown that strange, new, or unpopular doctrines tend to draw"
larger crowds than speakers who have nothing novel to offer the strolling curiosity seeker. But the complete absence of such prosecutions

against the more acceptable groups leads one to believe that on
many occasions the police are more ready to recognize an obstruction
46. Chariton v. Fitzsimmons, 87 Iowa 226, 54 N. W. 146 (1893); State v.
Sugarman, 126 Minn. 477, 148 N. W. 466 (1914); People v. Pierce, 85 App.
Div. 125, 83 N. Y. Supp. 79 (1903).
47. See the discussion of permit ordinances, p. 399; infra.

48. 265 Mass. 425, 164 N. E. 480, 62 A. L. R. 402 (1929).
49. 86 Cal. App. 2d 208, 194 P. 2d 588 (1948).
50. 85 App. Div. 170,83 N. Y. Supp. 130 (1903).

51. 190 Wash. 444, 68 P. ?d 1028 (1937).
52. 32 III.App. 245 (1889).
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to traffic when the subject matter or the speaker is distasteful to them.
The most frequently used device today for regulating and restricting the street meeting is the requirement that a permit be obtained from
some municipal officer prior to the holding of the meeting. The obvious advantage of the permit ordinance over the obstruction ordinance is in the fact that street meetings can be prevented or postponed prior to the occasion while the obstruction ordinance is only
worthwhile as a dispersal measure. This does not mean, of course,
that cities using the permit requirement discard obstruction ordinances. In Commonwealth v. Surridge53 a speaker was convicted of
obstructing the public street in spite of the fact that he had previously
obtained a permit for such speech.
Ordinances requiring the permit have generally been upheld in
the state courts. Two main lines of reasoning have been followed
by the courts in holding the permit requirement valid. The first is
the proprietary theory of Commonwealth v. Davis5 which holds
that since the streets are the property of the municipality, the municipality can restrict the uses to which streets may be put in any way
it chooses, and even forbid street meetings altogether. The second
line of reasoning emphasizes the public convenience approach. The
New York Court of Appeals, in upholding a permit ordinance,
stated:
The ordinance is valid, since it is a reasonable exercise of
the police power over the public streets. . . . Public streets are
primarily for public travel. They are dedicated to the public
for that purpose. They are thoroughfares intended for the use
of the public to enable persons to go from one place to another.
Any obstruction on the streets, whether permanent or temporary,
may be declared unlawful. 55
The courts of some states have held the permit requirement invalid, 56 but in these cases it was pointed out that no standards were
laid down by the ordinances to guide the administrative official in
granting or refusing the permits. Even in those states in which the
permit requirement has been upheld, the courts have usually stated
that arbitrary or unreasonable action on the part of the licensing
official in refusing permits will be considered ultra vires and give rise
53. 265 Mass. 425, 164 N. E. 480, 62 A. L. R. 402 (1929).
54. 162 Mass. 510, 39 N. E. 113 (1895).
55. People ex reL Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364 (1921).
56. Anderson v. Thdford, 80 Fla. 376, 85 So. 673, 10 A. L. R. 1481 (1920);
State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 190, 113 A. 385 (1921).
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to mandamus forcing the issuance of such permits.57 The general
view, then, appears to be somewhat similar-that officials cannot
withhold permits unreasonably, but that the permit requirement is
a valid exercise of the police power. The difference appears to be
that some courts prefer to rely on mandamus for remedial action,
if necessary, while others consider mandamus of doubtful value in
such cases and prefer to place the emphasis on a properly drawn
ordinance. As an example of the latter view, the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Coleman58 is interesting:
It is assumed by the ordinance that some citizens will be permitted by the chief of police to use the streets and parks . . .
for the purpose of exercising their constitutional right. That
being so, it is certain that the chief of police may not, by any
arbitrary process of selection, determine in advance who may
and who may not exercise it. If the permit is to be granted in
some instances and withheld in others, it must be in accordance
with some uniform rule which is not expressed in the ordinance
. . . We find the ordinance hopelessly indefinite.
No rule is
laid down to guide or restrain that power, or to inform applicants on what terms a permit will be granted.
Even in the absence of Connecticut precedent, we should be
unwilling to leave the constitutional liberties of a citizen. to be
defined and protected by the good impulses of a subordinate
official intrusted with unlimited discretion; if for no other reason than that the exercise of discretion cannot be controlled by
mandamus. 59
*

The more general view is that expressed in City of Duquesne v.
Fincke,60 in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the
conviction of Fincke under a municipal ordinance requiring a permit before holding a public meeting on the streets of Duquesne.
Fincke applied for a permit, but when the mayor took no action,
he held the meeting without it. Upon being arrested, Fincke contended that the ordinance violated the free speech and assembly
guarantees of the state and national constitutions. judge Simpson,
speaking for the court, stated:
If he wishes to address an assemblage he must gather his
audience together in places where he and they have the right
57.
58.
59.
60.

City of Duquesne v. Fincke, 269 Pa. 112, 112 A. 130 (1920).
96 Conn. 190, 113 A. 385 (1921).
Ibid., at 386, per Beach, J.
269 Pa. 112, 112 A. 130 (1920).
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to be for this purpose; and the streets are not such places, since
they are intended for passage and not for assemblage. 6 1
If they thought the city had power to authorize the meeting,
but the mayor was acting arbitrarily in refusing the permit,
their remedy was not by violating the ordinance, but by mandamus to compel a proper obedience to it, in which proceeding
the courts would have overturned "arbitrary and intentional un'62
fair discrimination in the administration of the ordinance."
English local governmental units have also made rather extensive
use of the permit power granted under various Parliamentary acts.
Attacked on the ground that they are unreasonable and occasionally
on the further ground that they are fatally indefinite, these ordi63
nances have been upheld in the majority of cases.
While the permit device has been generally accepted as a proper
method for regulating street meetings and is widely used throughout the United States, the United States Supreme Court rendered
a decision in 1951 in Kunz v. New York 6 1 which leavcs considerable
doubt as to whether the requirement.of a permit prior to the holding of a street meeting is a constitutional exercise of the police
power. In that case the Court merely held the New York City permit
ordinance unconstitutional, and the majority pointed out that a properly drawn ordinance might not have invoked their disapproval.
But the rather close circumscription of administrative authority in
the New York City ordinance suggests the possibility that any such
ordinance, if practicable as a regulatory device, would meet the same
fate. It might very reasonably be concluded, as did Justice Jackson
in dissenting from the majority view, that any ordinance attempting to require a permit prior to the holding of a street meeting which
gives administrative officials power to withhold or revoke permits
would be held unconstitutional. In other words, it seems that the
Court held in the Kunz case that the requirement of a permit merely
as a notificationdevice-in order that policing could be properly effected or in order to avoid the confusion of two groups meeting at the
61. Ibid., at 132.
62. tbid., at 134.
63. Cases sustaining the ordinances: Kruse v. Johnson [1898] 2 Q. B. 83
(church revival meeting); Reg. ex rel. Gay v. Powell, 51 L. T. (N. S.) 92
(Q. B. 1884) (music by Salvation Army); Slee v. Meadows, 75 J. P. 246
(K. B. 1911) (Salvation Army lecture). Contra: Johnson v. Mayor of Croyden, 16 Q. B. D. 708 (1886); Munro v. Watson, 57 L. T. (N. S.) 366 (Q. B.
1887) (Salvation Army singer). In the last case Mathew, J., said: "Permission to the mayor to license such music as he may see fit is an additional objection to the bye-law." Ibid., at 367.
64. 340 U. S. 290 (1951).
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samd'place and time - is legitimate. But municipal authorities cannot
prevent the meeting in advance. The Court did not state this view
explicitly, but it would seem to be implicit in the opinions of the
majority.
The ordinance under question made it unlawful to hold public
worship meetings on the streets without first obtaining a permit from
the city police commissioner. 6 5 It also made unlawful the collecting of any assemblage of persons to ridicule or denounce any form
of religious belief. The New York Court of Appeals construed the
ordinance to require that all initial requests for permits by eligible
applicants (ministers and clergymen) must be granted. The ordinance made no provision for revocation of permits or for denial of
permits to eligible applicants. Construction by the Court of Appeals,
however, was that after the required initial issuance, denial or revocation was proper if disorders occurred at previous meetings, or if
the terms of the ordinance were violated. The administrative decision as to the denial of the permit was to follow a hearing at which
complaints were to be filed, witnesses heard, and opportunity to
cross-examine given. The applicant then could appeal adverse decisions to the courts.
Kunz was a Baptist minister. In 1946 he applied for and received
a permit under the ordinance. In November, 1946, his permit was
revoked after a hearing by the police commissioner. The revocation
was based on evidence that he had ridiculed and denounced other religious beliefs in his meetings. He publicly denounced the Catholic
Church and called the Pope "the anti-Christ." The Jews he called
"Christ-killers," and, with reference to the burning of the Jews by
the Nazis, he stated: "All the garbage that didn't believe in Christ
should have been burnt in the incinerators. It's a shame they all
weren't." He testified that when an officer was not present at his
meetings, there was disorder, "but with an officer, no trouble." Admittedly, he had planned to continue future speeches in the same
vitriolic vein.
He applied for another permit in 1947 and again in 1948, but
was notified each time that his application was disapproved. In September, 1948, Kunz was arrested for speaking at Columbus Circle
65. For earlier cases concerning this same ordinance see: People v. Smith,
259 N. Y. 48, 180 N. E. 891 (1932) and People v. Smith, 263 N. Y. 255, 188
N. E. 745 (1934). It is interesting to note the change in attitude of the Court
between 1934 and 1951. The ordinance was challenged on a slightly different
ground in the 1934 case and the Court dismissed appeal for want of a substantial federal question. Smith v. New York, 292 U. S. 606 (1934).
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in New York City without a permit. Conviction was affirmed by the
66
New York Court of Appeals, three judges dissenting.
The question before the United States Supreme Court, according
to the majority, was the validity of an ordinance which permitted
the police commissioner to refuse to issue a permit for a religious
,treet meeting on the basis of his own interpretation of what was
,deemed to be conduct condemned by the ordinance.
To Justice Jackson, the lone dissenter in the case, the issue was
more narrowly drawn to meet the particular type of speech and assemblage covered by the facts. To him the issue was whether the
individual has a constitutional right to provoke -disorder by making
inflammatory and insulting speeches directed at the religious beliefs
of others.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for a majority of the Court,
quoted approvingly from Justice Roberts' opinion in the Hague case:
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." 67 The
Chief Justice said further, "Although this Court has recognized that
a statute may be enacted which prevents serious interference with
normal usage of streets and parks, we have consistently condemned
licensing systems which vest in an administrative official discretion
to grant or withhold a permit upon broad criteria unrelated to proper
regulation of public places." 68
The obvious question at this point would be, what steps, then,
can the municipality take to protect itself against assemblies which
have been disorderly in the past? The Chief Justice stated, "There
are appropriate public remedies to protect the peace and order of
the community if appellant's speeches should result in disorder or
violence . ... We do not express any opinion on the propriety of
punitive remedies which the New York authorities may utilize. We
are here concerned with suppression- not punishment. It is sufficient to say that New York cannot vest restraining control over the
right to speak on religious subjects in an administrative official where
there are no appropriate standards to guide his action." 69
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, said:
Administrative control over the right to speak must be based
66.
67.
68.
69.

300 N. Y. 273, 90 N. E. 2d 455 (1950).
Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939).
Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290, 293-4 (1951).
Ibid., 315.
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on appropriate standards, whether the speaking be done indoors
or out-of-doors. The vice to be guarded against is arbitrary action by officials. The fact that in a particular instance an action
appear not arbitrary does not save the validity of the authority
under which the action was taken.
In the present case, Kunz was not arrested for what he said
on the night of arrest, nor because at that time he was disturbing tfie peace or interfering with traffic. He was arrested because he spoke without a license, and the license was refused
because the police commissioner thought it likely on the basis
of past performance that Kunz would outrage the religious
sensibilities of others. If such had been the supportable finding
on the basis of fair standards in safeguarding peace in one of
the most populous centers of New York City, this Court would
not be justified in upsetting it. It would not be censorship in
advance. But here the standards are defined neither by language
nor by settled construction to preclude discriminatory or arbitrary action by officials. The ordinance, as judicially construed,
provides that anyone who, in the judgment of the licensing officials, would "ridicule" or "denounce" religion creates such a
danger of public disturbance that he cannot speak in any park
or street in the City of New York. Such a standard, considering
the informal procedure under which it is applied, too readily
permits censorship of religion by the licensing authorities. 70
Mr. Justice Jackson, in a strong dissenting opinion, gave the arguments in favor of public order at the sacrifice of some freedom of
assembly and expression. He pointed out that Kunz preached,
among many other things of like tenor, that "The Catholic Church
makes merchandise out of souls," that Catholicism is "a religion of
the devil," and that the Pope is "the anti-Christ." The Jews Kunz denounced as "Christ-killers." Justice Jackson classified such speech
in the same category as insulting or fighting words, which were held
not to be constitutionally protected in Chaplinsky v. State of New
Hampshire.7 1 In support of this contention he stated:
These terse epithets come down to our generation weighted
With hatreds accumulated through centuries of bloodshed. They
are recognized words of art in the profession of defamation. They
are not the kind of insult that men bandy and laugh off when
the spirits are high and the flagons are low. They are not in
70. 340 U. S. 285-6 (1951).
71. 315 U: S. 568, 571-572 (1942).
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that class of epithets whose literal sting will be drawn if the
speaker smiles when he uses them. They are always, and in
every context, insults which do not spring from reason and can
be answered by none. . . . Of course, people might pass this
speaker by as a mental case, and so they might file out of a
theatre in good order at the cry of "fire." But in-both cases
there is genuine likelihood that someone will get hurt.Y72
Justice Jackson objected strenuously to the action of the Court in
invalidating the New York ordinance because of the absence of proper standards.
I do not see how this Court can condemn municipal ordinances for not setting forth comprehensive First Amendment
standards. This Court never has announced what those standards must be, it does not now say what they are, and it is not
clear that any majority could agree on them. In no field are
there more numerous individual opinions among the Justices.
The Court as an institution not infrequently disagrees with its
former self or relies on distinctions that are not very substantial. It seems hypercritical to strike down local laws on their
faces for want of standards when we have no standards. 73
Finally, he pointed out that the City of New York has special
problems because of the "diverse nationalities, races, religions, and
political associations" which make up the "vast hordes of people living in its narrow confines." He stated:
In this case there is no evidence of a purpose to suppress
speech, except to keep it in bounds that will not upset good order
.... This Court should be particularly sure of its ground before
it strikes down, in a time like this, the going, practical system
by which New York has sought to control its street-meeting
problem.7 4
Justice Jackson's emphasis here was on the practical, orderly system by which the City of New York undertook to solve its problems,
and he objected to what he considered rather arbitrary action by
the Court in overturning this system.
72. Kunz v. State of New York, 340 U. S. 290, 299 (1951).

73. Ibid., 308.
74. Ibid., 314.

In his concurrence with the majority Justice Frankfurter
pointed out that the majority in the New York Court of Appeals, which upheld the ordinance, were, to a man, non-residents of New York City, while
all of the three dissenting judges were New York City residents who, presumably, were acquainted with the "special problems" of that city.
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We find that issuance [of a permit] the first time is required.
benial is warranted only in such unusual cases as where an
applicant has had a permit which has been revoked for cause and
he asserts the right to continue the conduct which was cause for
revocation. If anything less than a reasonable certainty of disorder was shown, denial of a permit would be improper. The
procedure by which that decision is reached commends itself
to the orderly mind -complaints are filed, witnesses are heard,
opportunity to cross-examine is given, and decision is reached
by what we must assume to be an impartial and reasonable administrative officer, and, if he denies the permit, the applicant
may carry his cause to the courts. He may thus have a civil
test of his rights without the personal humiliation of being
arrested as presenting a menace to public order. It seems to
me that this procedure better protects freedom of speech than
to let everyone speak without leave, but subject to surveillance
and to being ordered to stop in the discretion of the police. 75
This case appears to develop the embryonic ideas of Hague v.
to full maturity. Here is conduct and speech completely
repulsive to all canons of good taste and rationality, but which,
nevertheless, the majority of the Court holds cannot be prohibited
in advance by an ordinance which, it would seem, is drawn rather
carefully in favor of the applicant for a permit. There would seemto be no question, however, but that the ordinance does place a
prior restraint on freedom of speech and assembly. The Court's
emphasis on a properly drafted ordinance indicates that not all prior
restraints are unconstitutional, but only those which are unreasonable.
However, if the New York City ordinance be unconstitutional, then
it appears that the Court need take only a slight step further- if,
indeed, it has not already done so- to deliver the coup de grace to
the permit system in such situations by holding that any permit requirement other than one which constitutes merely a notification or
reservation device represents unconstitutional restraint.
One writer agrees with Justice Jackson that a properly drawn
permit ordinance would actually result in greater protection to legitimate assemblages than would the practice of requiring no permits
and leaving the problem of determining whether particular speeches
should be stopped to the discretion of the police officer who happened
C.1.0.76

75. Ibid., 312.
76. 307 U. S. 496 (1939).
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to be in the neighborhoodY' The suggestion is that the police officer
will have a presumption in favor of the legitimacy of the assembly
if it be previously approved by some municipal licensing official and
will not be so apt to disperse the meeting, in the event of disorders,
as he will be to offer protection to the speaker. This argument is
based on two premises. First it assumes discretion on the part of
the licensing official since the police officer need not consider the
meeting presumptively valid if permits are issued to all merely on
request. Second it presupposes a police officer with a rather capricious nature if presumed to feel a 9ompulsion to make arrests under
the no-permit system which he does not feel under a permit system.
In at least one case there is evidence that the obtaining of a permit
does not preclude the possibility of arrest for obstruction or, a fortiori,
disorderly conduct.78
There would seem to be two major arguments against this position.
In the first place, any permit system which does not leave the way
open for at least a limited number of areas in which non-permit,
spontaneous speeches and assemblies may be held does not leave the
individual the full measure of freedom which would be desirable in
an open society. The more popular streets, insofar as street speakers
are concerned, might well be allocated on a permit basis of first come
first served, leaving license official to refuse or revoke. To protect
even more carefully the freedom to assemble in the public ways,
meetings in even these latter streets might be considered to "require"
a permit only in the sense that they are reservations, and thus unannounced or "unlicensed" speeches and assemblies would still be
proper where no previous group had made a reservation.
In the second place, Justice Jackson's argument that the permit
system, as a discretionary licensing arrangement, gives more freedom than would derive from leaving a determination of the propriety of a meeting to the unbridled discretion of the local police officer
assumes that these are the only alternatives in solving the problem.
A third possibility is a liberal permit system and a properly supervised and trained police force which will protect, rather than restrict,
the rights of free speech and free assembly. The point that the majority of the Court since the Hague case has been apparently trying
to drive home is that the people in the United States are guaranteed
77. Quillian, Soapbox OratoricalPrivilege v. Municipal Tranquility, 14 GA.
B. J. 191 (1951).
78. Commonwealth v. Surridge, 265 Mass. 425, 164 N. E. 480 (1929), at
p. 482: "To undertake to authorize such obstruction of a public way .. . .
was beyond the ordinance making power of the city council. The permit afforded no protection to the defendant."
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very..broad rights of speech and assembly. If there be unreasonable
restraints placed on their exercise by local police officers, then these
practices should also be attacked by the Court under its review powers. The police officer must be instructed that the presumption, if there
are to be presumptions, must be in favor of continuing the meeting.
This assumes that there is no incitement to riot or unlawful assembly,
of course. The only excuses for dispersing a lawful meeting in
the public ways would be either that the flow of traffic would have
been substantially impeded or that disorders would have been imminent which he could not have suppressed with the forces at his command.7 9
While highway obstruction ordinances and permit requirements
are probably the most frequently used devices for dispersing or limiting street meetings, another possibility for dispersals in the hands
of the police officer is arrest on a charge of disorderly conduct. In
this, as in the enforcement of highway obstruction ordinances, the
problem is squarely one of administration of the law. And it is to
be suspected that in this field, just as in the two mentioned, arrests
are frequently made as much on the basis of prejudice as on the basis
of a real finding of disorderly conduct. No matter with what eloquence and fervor the Court denounce thd arbitrary administration
of a licensing system, the patrolman customarily has a broad area
of discretion in determining whether or not a highway is obstructed
or whether or, not a breach of the peace is imminent. These, of
course, are questions of fact. But the presumption of validity which
police courts usually accord the actions of police officers makes it
difficult for a defendant in such a case to controvert the conclusions
or apprehensions of a police officer, no matter what evidence the defendant may introduce.80
Even a civil liberties conscious United States Supreme Court
seems to have fallen into this same pattern in its decision in Feiner
79. Even so enlightened a treatment of the subject as that published for

police instruction by the Chicago Park District, The Police and Minority Groups
(Chicago, 1947), discusses the role of the police officer in tension situations
from the standpoint of the techniques for breaking up an assembly without a
single point of emphasis on the intelligent attempt on the part of the officer
to determine whether the assembly is a lawful one requiring him, constitutionally, to prevent hostile groups from interfering with it, or whether he can
constitutionally disperse the entire group.

80. See 47 YAL L. J. 404 (1938), notes 49 and 50 in which the author
cites support for a suspicion that police magistrates "usually exhibit a decided
propensity to agree with the police, become impatient with defendants who do
not plead guilty and with the unskilled manner in which those defendants who
cannot afford counsel conduct their own defense." Id., p. 412.
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v. People of New York, 8 ' rendered on the same day as the Kunz
decision.
In the Feiner case, Irving Feiner was addressing, from a wooden
box, a group of listeners on a street corner in Syracuse, New York.
A crowd of some seventy-five or eighty people was gathered on the
sidewalks and spilling into the street. Feiner was urging the audience to attend a speech later that night on the subject of racial discrimination, and during the appeal Feiner made derogatory remarks
about President Truman, the American Legion, the Mayor of Syracuse, and other local political officials. He also said that "colored
people don't have equal rights and they should rise up in arms and
fight for them."
Two officers were sent to the meeting and stated that the crowd
was restless and there was some pushing, shoving and milling around.
One man said to the police officers, "If you don't get that son of a
bitch off, I will go over and get him off there myself." The police
officers told Feiner to cease speaking, and, when he refused, arrested
him for disorderly conduct.
A majority of six in the Supreme Court considered that the facts
clearly indicated sufficient evidence of a possible breach of the peace
to warrant Feiner's arrest for disorderly conduct.
The Chief Justice, speaking for the majority, stated that "Petitioner was neither arrested nor convicted for the making or the content
of his speech. Rather it was the reaction which it actually engendered. '82
" He stated further:
We are well aware that the ordinary murmurings and objections of a hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence a speaker,
and are also mindful of the possible danger of giving overzealous police officials complete discretion to break up otherwise
lawful public meetings .... But we are not faced here with such
a situation. It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used
as an instrument for the oppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here -the speaker passes the bounds
of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot,
they are powerless to prevent a breach of the.peace.8 3
It is submitted that there is a substantial contradiction in the reasoning of the Chief Justice. If Feiner was not arrested and convicted for either the making or the content of his speech but, instead,
81. 340 U. S. 315 (1951).
82. Ibid., 319-320.
83. Ibid., 320-321.
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for the "reaction which it actually engendered," then it is difficult
to see how incitement to riot can be concluded. It would seem more
reasonable, from the facts, to conclude that this was a case of a lawful assembly which attracted a hostile audience. No testimony was
entered to indicate that the police made any effort to still the pushing and muttering of the crowd. The "trigger" which set off the arrest
was not mob action in obedience to the exhortations of the speaker
but the statement of a hostile listener that he would get Feiner off
the box from which he was speaking. It appears from the holding
in this case that it should be no very difficult matter for a few people
to get an unpopular speaker arrested for incitement to riot through
the simple device of telling a policeman that they intended to pull
the speaker from his podium. Since the majority admittedly did
not upheld the conviction on the basis of the content of the speech,
rebuttal to the above argument cannot properly center on the words
used by Feiner. The Chief Justice flatly stated that it was rather
the reaction which the speech actually engendered. If this be not
conditioning the right of speech and assembly on the degree of hostility of the audience to the speaker, then it is difficult to see what
facts would present such a situation.8 4
Justices Black and Douglas gave vigorous dissenting opinions,
Justice Minton concurring with the latter. Justice Black stated:
As to the existence of a dangerous situation on the street
corner, it seems far-fetched to suggest that the "facts" show
any imminent threat of riot or uncontrollable disorder. It is
neither unusual nor unexpected that some people at public street
meetings mutter, mill about, push, shove, or disagree, even violently, with the speaker. Indeed, it is rare where controversial
topics are discussed that an outdoor crowd does not do some
or all of these things. Nor does one isolated threat to assault
the speaker forbode disorder ....
Moreover, assuming that the "facts" did indicate a critical
situation, I reject the implication of the Court's opinion that
the police had no obligation to protect petitioner's constitutional
right to talk. But if, in the name of preserving order, they
ever can interfere with a lawful public speaker, they first must
make all reasonable efforts to protect him. Here the policemen did not even pretend to try to protect petitioner ....
Their
84. On the problem of a hostile audience see: A. V. Dicey, op. cit., pp. 273276; Chafee, The Problem of the Hostile Audience, 49 CoL. L. Rmv. 1118
(1949).
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duty was to protect petitioner's right to talk, even to the extent of arresting the man who threatened to interfere. Instead,
they shirked that duty and acted only to suppress the right to
speak.8 5
He continued by pointing out an "alarming similarity" between
the power the majority would hereby allow the police and that
possessed by English officials under an act passed by Parliament in
1795.86 In that year Justices of the Peace were authorized to arrest
persons who spoke in a manner which could be characterized as
"inciting and stirring up the People to Hatred or Contempt ..
of the King or the Government.
justice Douglas was in substantial agreement with the sentiments
expressed by his brother dissenter. He stated:
[This record] shows an unsympathetic audience and the threat
of one man to haul the speaker from the stage. It is against
that kind of threat that speakers need police protection. If they
do not receive it and instead the police throw their weight on
the side of those who would break up the meetings, the police
become the new censors of speech. Police censorship has all the
vices of the censorship from city halls which we have repeatedly
87
struck down.
It would seem that if the Court were interested in erecting safeguards around the exercise of freedom of speech and assembly, it
would not stop at a perusal of permit ordinances but would review
closely the enforcement of common-law and statutory provisions regarding highway obstructions and breaches of the peace, where First
Amendment freedoms come into play. The heart of the problem
of the exercise of these rights is, after all, quite frequently not in
the accidental phrasing of an ordinance but in the day-to-day actions
of administrative personnel- and this includes the neighborhood
police officer. It matters little that the Court, in a burst of rhetoric,
condemns an ordinance which "on its face invades First Amendment
freedoms" when in the next breath it condones police action in dispersing a meeting on grounds which a reasonable man might consider equally as arbitrary as those offered as reasons for denying
or revoking a permit.
The emphasis by the trial court and the majority in the Supreme
Court on the fact that the police officer had to "request" and then
85. Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315, 325-327 (1951).
86. 36 Geo. III, c. 8, § 7.
87. Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315, 331 (1951).
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"tell" Feiner to stop implies that there is something illegal in itself
in a refusal to obey a police officer. If the assembly were lawful,
then it would seem that the speaker had the right to ignore the order
of the policeman. If it were not lawful, then the refusal to comply
would constitute a separate offense, and there would seem to be no
reason to belabor the question in an examination of the propriety of
the conviction for making an unlawful speech. The gravamen of
the offense assuredly should have been the improper speech, not the
refusal to obey the officer.
The facts and the holding in the Feiner case very closely parallel
an English case in 1936, Duncan,v.Jones, which aroused substantial
criticism among English students of constitutional law.88 That case
centered around the offense of "obstructing an officer in the execution of his duty." The Feinercase suggests, at least to the minority,
that Feiner's conviction was upheld as much because he ignored the
officer's request to cease speaking as for incitement to riot. In the
Duncan case, Mrs. Duncan was about to make a speech in a street
near a training center for unemployed. One year previously, Mrs.
Duncan had made an address on the general subject of free speech
at the same location, and following the meeting a disturbance took
place inside the center which the superintendent of the center attributed to the meeting. In the instant case, Jones. a police inspector,
told Mrs. Duncan that she could not make the address on that street,
but could make it on some other street. She persisted, and was
arrested for obstructing an officer in the execution of his duty. It
was not alleged that there was any obstruction of the highway, nor
was it alleged that any of the persons at the meeting had either committed, incited or provoked any breach of the peace. Conviction
for the stated offense was obtained in the lower court. On appeal,
conviction was upheld, with the court stating, per Lord Hewart, C. J.,
that "English law does not recognize any special right of public
meeting for political or other purposes."
(This is, of course, the
basic difference between English and American law regarding public
meetings. The differences between English and American practice
regarding public meetings are not, however, as substantial as the legal
differences might lead one to expect.) It was further stated, per
Humphreys, J., that "Here it is found as a fact that the respondent
reasonably apprehended a breach of the peace. It then . . . be88. Duncan v. Jones, 1 K. B. 218 (1936).
DUCTI

For comment see: DicEy, INTRO274 (9th London ed.
1935) ; 18 Canadian

N TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CO NSTITUTIO,
1948); WADr, CONSTITUTION1TAL LAW 179 (2nd London ed.

Bar Rev. 646-649 (1940).
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came his duty to prevent anything which in his view would cause
that breach of the peace. While he was taking steps so to do he was
wilfully obstructed by the appellant. I can conceive no dearer case
within the statutes than that."8 9
In Burton v. Power,90 a New Zealand case, a mefhber of the
"'Pacifist Society" held a meeting in a public reserve and persisted
in addressing it after being forbidden by a police constable to do so.
His conviction for wilfully obstructing the constable in the execution of his duty was affirmed because the Court, following Duncan
v. Jones, supra, was satisfied that the constable had a reasonable
apprehension that breaches of the peace would occur which it was
his duty to prevent. Support for this was found in the history of
previous meetings of the society at which incidents occurred which
gave reasonable cause for apprehending a breach of the peace on this
occasion. In his decision Myers, C. J., stated: "This is not a charge
against the appellant for being a pacifist or for holding opinions of
any particular subject, nor does the case involve the law of unlawful
assembly or any question of freedom of speech in any fair sense of
the term." 91
Certainly there was no question of unlawful assembly, but equally
certain there is a question of freedom of speech. In effect the
courts in both the Duncan and the Burton cases were saying that
so long as the speech is popular with all the audience, then the assembly may congregate and the speaker continue. But no matter
what the speaker is saying, if some of the audience is or becomes
hostile and threatens a breach of the peace, then the police officer
is bound to disperse the assembly and stop the speaker. And a refusal to disperse or cease- speaking constitutes the statutory offense
of obstructing an officer in the execution of his duty.
It is difficult to see how a judge could so blandly brush aside basic
freedoms of speech and assembly and leave the exercise of these entirely dependent on whether or not the police officer "reasonably"
apprehends a breach of the peace. It also leaves broad powers of
obstruction-in the hands of groups hostile to the particular participants in such an assembly, since all that is necessary to prevent future meetings is to create a disturbance at a meeting. Such disturbance, then, would give the police officer grounds for "apprehending
a breach of the peace" at all future gatherings of the group. The
proper course would appear to be to permit the assembly, if it be
89. Ibid., 218.

90. [1940] N. Z. L. R. 305.
91. Ibid., 306.
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lawful, and offer sufficient protection to the speaker and his followers
to forestall any breach of the peace. If sufficient police protection to.
prevent a disturbance be unavailable, then it would be time enough
to sacrifice the rights of speech and assembly in the interest of public
order.
Until the Feinercase, the American courts had been drawing away
from the narrowly restrictive view indicated by the English and New
Zealand courts in Duncan v. Jones and Burton v. Power, respectively. Now the distinction between English and American practice seems
to be less apparent, although it is to be suspected that the United
States Supreme Court would probably have held differently on the.
facts presented in the Duncan and Burton cases.
The City of White Plains, New York, presents an interesting example of the use of the disorderly conduct ordinance to control street
meetings. No ordinance requiring permits for street meetings has
been passed by White Plains. But the practice (apparently endorsed
by both police and city council) has been to disperse all street meetings except those held by religious organizations. 92
In November of 1948 two leaders of the American Labor Party
made a political address on a street corner 'in White Plains.93 The
two men had mounted a stepladder and in their ensuing speech criticised the Republican and Democratic bipartisan foreign policy as
"leading down' the road to war and Fascism." Police testified that
the meeting had blocked the sidewalks and the street, and that the
speakers were arrested for disorderly conduct when they refused
to stop after being ordered to do so by the police.
City officials contended that political meetings should be confined
to halls and lots, with streets reserved for traffic.
The defendants offered proof that they had written to the city
asking protection at the meeting and that the public safety commissioner had replied that he had no authority to permit political street
meetings. Six witnesses testified that lanes for pedestrians were
kept open on the sidewalks and that traffic moved continuously on
the streets. The police chief conceded "nothing disorderly" occurred
at the meeting. He estimated the crowd at fifty to seventy-five
persons and said his patrolmen had to "struggle to keep traffic moving."

The party leaders were eager to hold such meetings in working92. The New York Times, Nov. 29, 1948, p.22, col. 3.
93. The facts in the case are set out in The New York Times, Nov. 5, 1948,
p. 5, col. 3.
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class residential areas because of the audiences there that might
94
otherwise not be reached.
The trial court found the defendants guilty as charged, and the
speakers were sentenced to fines of ten dollars or a term in jail of
95
ten days.
Here is a city which attempts informally to prohibit all street
meetings except those held by religious organizations. The holding
in Hague v. C.I.0.6 while directly applicable to parks rather than
streets, would seem to have been broad enough to put the official
stamp of disapproval on such practices. Both this example and the
use of an ordinance, as in the Kunz case, to limit street speaking
to religious persons or organizations raise another question - that
of the constitutionality of permitting religious street meetings, whether
by permit or by custom, and denying that privilege to other groups.
Customarily, the Court has permitted the states broad powers of
classification, but where a classification, otherwise reasonable, interferes with a proper exercise of First Amendment freedoms, then
it is to be assumed that such classification is unconstitutional.
The White Plains incident raises another question which is fundamental to a determination of exactly how much freedom Americans
have to assemble in their public streets: how faithfully do the police
courts in American cities follow the mandates of the United States Supreme Court with regard to freedom of speech and assembly? In spite
of the holding in the Hague case the White Plains court held the
speakers guilty of disorderly conduct in 1948. Very possibly, in
spite of the holding of the Kunz case and Niemotko v. State of MaryZand 97 in 1951, the White Plains officials will continue in the future
with their restrictive policy with respect to street meetings. A proper analysis of the right to assemble in the public ways in the United
States would require a dose study of police practices and training
with regard to street meetings in all cities of sufficient size to encounter the problem - virtually an impossible task because of the
paucity of records of police court trials. But this is the focal point
of conflict between public order and freedom to assemble, since 6 nly
a very small percentage of the total number of cases go beyond this
stage - only a handful have reached the United States Supreme
Court. If the Recorders' courts choose to "distinguish" their cases
from those decided in the United States Supreme Court, then only
94.
95.
96.
97.

Editorial, The New York Times, Nov. 29, 1948, p. 22, col. 3.
The New York Times, Nov. 30, 1948, p. 24, col. 6.
307 U. S. 496 (1939).
340 U. S. 268 (1951).
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appeal to higher state courts or even to the United States Supreme
Court can correct the error. Appeals are expensive and time-consuming, and the result oftentimes is that the convicted defendant
simply pays the fine and the restrictions against street meetings continue to operate. It is to be hoped that such instances represent a
small minority of the total number.
As the cases analyzed have indicated, the basic problem in the regulation of street assemblies is the reconciliation between public order
and convenience on the one hand and individual liberty on the other.
While it would be impracticable to require that a city such as New
York, for example, allow complete freedom to any and all types
of street assemblies, it does appear that municipalities might properly
sacrifice some aspects of public convenience in favor of a broader
right to speak in the streets. Meeting places in larger cities are at
a premium at the present time - particularly for groups with little
money backing. Municipal streets and parks ma: ,:err well be their
only forum. Regimentation of thought appear--. to be a major fear
in the minds of many Americans today. If we are to avoid being
cast in a mold of single-mindedness, every encouragement should be
given to the gestation of new ideas and opinions. Itwould seem that
the guarantee of broad protections to street speakers and street assemblies would be a step in this direction. The advanages to an open
society which accrue from free discussion of new .r even unpopular
ideas more than offset the disadvantages of inconvenience or even
some violence. Maintaining the King's peace is not always the paramount consideration.
The question is, of course, one of balancing conflicting interests.
The suggestion here is that the scales might fruitfully be shifted in the
direction of broader individual liberty.
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